The struggle between equity and efficiency: do Nordic countries have a free lunch? by Berthold, Norbert & Brunner, Alexander
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Berthold, Norbert; Brunner, Alexander
Working Paper
The struggle between equity and
efficiency: do Nordic countries have a
free lunch?
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge des Lehrstuhls für Volkswirtschaftslehre,
Wirtschaftsordnung und Sozialpolitik, Universität Würzburg, No. 103
Provided in cooperation with:
Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg
Suggested citation: Berthold, Norbert; Brunner, Alexander (2008) : The struggle between equity
and efficiency: do Nordic countries have a free lunch?, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge
des Lehrstuhls für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftsordnung und Sozialpolitik, Universität






The Struggle between Equity 
and Efficiency - Do Nordic Countries  









des Lehrstuhls für Volkswirtschaftslehre, 
insbes. Wirtschaftsordnung und Sozialpolitik 












The Struggle between Equity 
and Efficiency - Do Nordic Countries  











Bayerische Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg 









 The Struggle between Equity and Eﬃciency - Do
Nordic Countries Have a Free Lunch?






Obwohl in der theoretischen Literatur die Existenz eines Trade-Oﬀs zwi-
schen Eﬃzienz und Gerechtigkeit deutlich bejaht wird, ist dieser in der
Empirie nur schwierig zu ﬁnden. Darüber hinaus scheint der Trade-Oﬀ
von den verschiedenen europäischen Sozialmodellen unterschiedlich gut
bewältigt zu werden. In einigen Ländern scheint sogar kein Trade-Oﬀ zu
bestehen, so dass die Vermutung besteht, dass ein „free lunch“ existiert.
In diesem Paper nutzen wir Daten der Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS)
um empirisch zu evaluieren, ob (a) tatsächlich ein „free lunch“ existiert
und ob (b) eine strukturelle Überlegenheit des nordischen Sozialsystems
vorliegt.
Abstract
Although there is a vast theoretical literature on the existence of a trade-
oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency, empirical investigations often fail to ﬁnd
evidence for this proposition. Furthermore there are hints that some social
models in Europe can cope better with this trade-oﬀ and are actually
able to provide what economists call a "free lunch". In this paper we use
data from the Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS) to evaluate (a) whether
there really exists something like a free lunch and (b) whether some social
systems are actually better in coping with the trade-oﬀ between equity
and eﬃciency.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: D61, D63
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31 Preface
The existence of a trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency is a well-known the-
oretical concept in economics.1 Government action in the market for equity’s
sake usually leads to a loss in eﬃciency. Nevertheless this "well known" trade-
oﬀ is empirically hard to ﬁnd.2 To make things even more confusing, there are
hints that some countries may be more able in coping with this trade-oﬀ. The
Scandinavian welfare system seems to provide more equity than any other Eu-
ropean social systems at virtually no GDP cost. As a result, there is an urgent
need to understand and solve this "free lunch" puzzle.
On the other hand there has been rather a lot of discussion on the supposed
steady decline of "social justice" in Europe. Globalization and economic freedom
are suspected to incite inequality and poverty as rising global competition puts
pressure on the welfare states resulting in a race to the bottom. However,
this suggestion does not match with the evidence from the Nordic countries:
openness and more economic freedom have not rolled back social justice.3 After
all, the relationship between equity and eﬃciency seems rather cumbersome to
grasp. In this paper we therefore try to evaluate the magnitude of the trade-
oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency and further explore whether the trade-oﬀ is
so small that it would be fair to claim that a free lunch exists. We moreover
concentrate on the Nordic Welfare Sytems, which seem to have an outstanding
performance in coping with this trade-oﬀ. Thus, we aim to make a useful
contribution to the ongoing discussion of this topic.4
In the remainder of this paper we ﬁrst give a brief summary of the diﬀerent
welfare systems in Europe (Chapter 2). After that we show some descriptive
evidence for the existence of a free lunch, using aggregate data from the Lux-
embourg Income Studies (Chapter 3). Furthermore we investigate the existence
of a free lunch empirically (Chapter 4) and present the corresponding results
1 Okun, A.M. (1975), , Friedman, M. (1975),
2 Lindert, P.H. (2004a), , Lindert, P.H. (2003), .
3 Bergh, A. (2006a),
4 Bergh, A. (2006a), , Bergh, A. (2006b), , Bergh, A. (2006c), , Lindert, P.H.
(2003), , Lindert, P.H. (2004a), , Lindert, P.H. (2004b), , Lindert, P.H. (2006a),
, Lindert, P.H. (2006b),
4(Chapter 5). After a short discussion of these, we ﬁnally present our conclusions
(Chapter 6).
2 European Welfare Systems
The existence of one European Welfare System can be conﬁdently discarded.
Since Gosta Esping-Andersen’s "Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism"5 at the
latest, the idea of a typology of welfare states is rather common in the social
sciences. He puts a special emphasis on the importance of history and norms in
classifying the diﬀerent systems, since it is not only the amount of money which
is dedicated to welfare, but also the institutional design of the distributional
channels that matter. Although money and institutional design sometimes con-
incide, there are still important diﬀerences. The quite generous German welfare
state is characterized by its rather strong stratiﬁcation of beneﬁts, while the
Nordic model is also generous but much more universal, i.e. a Beveridge-style
welfare system. On the other hand, the Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon sys-
tem can be described as both universal but the latter is much stricter than the
former. These basic criteria simplify the designs of the welfare regimes and of
course there are still huge diﬀerences within each of these worlds, but at least
some features can be found that help distinguish the worlds from each other.
Albeit being far from perfect, we use the concept of classifying the diﬀerent
kinds of welfare systems for our further analysis. We do not use the original
concept of three classiﬁcations but rather adopt the suggestion proposed by e.g.
Ferrara6 and Sapir7 to distinguish between four systems, as the Mediterranean
countries which were classiﬁed as "corporatist" in the original Esping-Andersen
in the meantime systematically diﬀer from the Continental countries. As we use
LIS data, we only consider those countries for which we have suﬃcient data.8
As suggested by Ferrara we then assign each of these countries to one "world"
of welfare capitalism, namely Nordic (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway),
5 Estping-Andersen, G. (1990),
6 Ferrara, M. (1998),
7 Sapir, A. (2005a), .
8 "Suﬃcient" for our purposes means, that there are at least data in three of the ﬁve LIS
waves for a country.
5Anglo-Saxon (Great Britain, Ireland), Continental (Germany, France, Austria,
Benelux-Countries, Switzerland) and Mediterranean (Italy, Spain).9 The corrse-
ponding classiﬁcation can be found in table 1.
World Member Countries
Nordic Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway
Anglo-Saxon Great Britain, Ireland




As a ﬁrst step we use these country clusters for some descriptive statistics to get
a main overview of the performance of the diﬀerent worlds of welfare systems.
Therefore it is worthwhile to ﬁrst evaluate the generosity of the diﬀerent welfare
regimes expressed as social spending as percentage of total GDP. Not surpris-
ingly we ﬁnd a lot of variation between the diﬀerent worlds. As we can see in
ﬁgure 1 (p. 7), the Nordic countries assign the largest share of GDP to social
spending, while the Anglo-Saxon Countries only attribute a comparatively small
amount to welfare. The Mediterranean and Continental clusters are somewhere
in between, with the latter being somewhat more generous, even showing some
evidence of overtaking the Nordics.
Figure 1: Expenditure
When we look not at social spending but total government expenditure, the ﬁrst
9 Ferrara, M. (1998), p. 85-87.
6impression is conﬁrmed (See ﬁgure 2, p. 7). Recent development shows, that
the Nordic countries have the largest governments, although there has been a
signiﬁcant cutback since the middle of the 1990s. In any case, there is still a large
diﬀerence between the top and the bottom welfare regimes. Putting together
this evidence, economic theory would therefore suggest that the generous welfare
state and the immense encroachment in the market mechanism that goes with
it would lead to a huge loss of eﬃciency, which should result in a relatively low
GDP per capita.
Figure 2: Total Government Expenditure
As a matter of fact, the huge diﬀerence in the generosity of the welfare state
does not correspond with a much lower GDP per capita as can be seen in ﬁgure
3 (p. 8). Albeit the median GDP per capita of the Nordic countries is not the
highest in comparison, there is no large gap between them and the Anglo-Saxon
countries, which have the highest GDP per head. The latter is especially due
to the fact that the economic development of Ireland has been one of the most
remarkable and unexpected trends in Europe’s latest history. In any case, with
respect to the huge involvement of the government in the market, the Nordic
countries make a surprising stand. As a matter of fact, this is the ﬁrst part of
the free lunch puzzle. The second part shall be the diﬀerence in the performance
of the welfare state in the pursuit of equity.
7Figure 3: Log GDP
3 Welfare State Performance
Measuring equity is rather cumbersome. For example, the scope of poverty is
not restricted to the ﬁnancial situation of the family, as social exclusion is a
complex phenomenon that aﬀects the life of people at the risk of poverty in
many diﬀerent ways. Being aware of this, we refer to the huge literature on this
topic.10 In the present paper, we restrict our analysis to ﬁnancial indicators of
equity, making quantiﬁcation much easier. As our main aim is to evaluate the
tradeoﬀ between equity and eﬃciency, i.e. the eﬀect of government spending on
GDP, we regard this approach as suﬃcient. To evaluate the performance with
respect to the pursuit of equity of the four "worlds" we use the LIS data, that is
to say the Gini-Coeﬃcient, the 80/20-ratio and the 90/10-ratio. Unfortunately,
the observations are not provided continuously. Hence we restrict (as described
above) our analysis to countries with at least three observed waves.11
As a measure of performance of the diﬀerent welfare regimes we use, among
other things, the poverty rate. This indicator has a crucial relevance, as ﬁghting
poverty can be seen as the major target of redistributive welfare policy. Un-
fortunately even the measurement of ﬁnancial poverty is rather arduous with
respect to the "right" unit of measurement and the corresponding deﬁnition of
10 Atkinson, T., B. Cantillon, E. Marlier, B. Nolan (2002),
11 We assign the observations of each country to one of the ﬁve waves around
1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 200 respectively, as suggested by the LIS. Cf.
http://www.lisproject.org/techdoc/datasets.htm.
8a poverty line.12 None of the diﬀerent approaches can be considered as being
the only "correct" one, so there is still some leeway for ideological creed in the
deﬁnition. For our purposes we adopt the deﬁnition of the LIS Project, which
refers to the household as the appropriate unit of analysis. A household is con-
sidered as being at the risk of poverty if the equivalence disposable household
income lies below the poverty line, expressed as a given percentage (here: 50%
and 60%) of the overall median equivalence disposable income in a country. The
equivalence income (economic "well being" W) is computed as the fraction of
disposable income (D) and household size (S) in the following way: W = D
SE,
where, "E" is the equivalence elasticity which is assumed to be 0.5.13
Using equality indicators as measures of equity is much more problematic than
the poverty rate. The pursuit of income equality as a policy aim is far more
ideologically shaped. Although the measures poverty and equality are highly
correlated, it is worthwhile to use diﬀerent measurements to carefully evaluate
the diﬀerent impacts of encoachment in the market mechanism.14 However it
has to be stressed that the aim of our paper is solely the evaluation of the
tradeoﬀ between equity and eﬃciency. We therefore explicitly do not want to
take sides in the debate of what kind of social justice is desirable or not.
Our ﬁrst concern is the performance of the diﬀerent regimes regarding the
equality of income distribution. We therefore compute the median of the Gini-
coeﬃcient for each world over time. As we can see in table 2, the Nordic
countries make a surprising stand, having the lowest inequality in comparison.
world 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Continental 0.290 0.248 0.262 0.266 0.275
Nordic 0.210 0.225 0.230 0.220 0.249
Anglo-Saxon 0.270 0.316 0.336 0.336 0.328
Mediterranean 0.318 0.319 0.300 0.346 0.338
Table 2: Development of the Gini-Coeﬃcient
12 Hagenaars, A., K. de Vos (1988),
13 Atkinson, A.B., L. Rainwater, T.M. Smeeding (1995), . It goes without saying
that this value is rather arbitrary.
14 The correlation of the gini with the poverty rate is roundabout 87%.
9The other equality indicators all point in the same direction. Although there
has been some rise in the 80
20 and the 90
10 ratio, the Nordic countries still have
the lowest inequality in comparison to the other welfare states (Cf. table 3).
world 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Continental 2.117 2.066 2.086 2.152 2.151
(3.392) (2.941) (3.003) (3.301) (3.302)
Nordic 1.822 1.924 1.908 1.892 1.996
(2.597) (2.815) (2.783) (2.640) (2.849)
Anglo-Saxon 2.343 2.633 2.947 2.791 2.756
(3.530) (4.006) (4.668) (4.397) (4.526)
Mediterranean 2.597 2.615 2.487 2.841 2.714
(4.368) (4.267) (3.896) (4.884) (4.631)
Table 3: Development of the 80
20 and (in brackezs) 90
10 ratio.
Taking a look at the development of the poverty indicators, the previous pic-
ture remains valid. As we can see in table 4, the Nordic countries are the
most successfull in ﬁghting poverty. Only the Continental countries provide a
comparable performance in ﬁghting poverty, leaving the Mediterranean and the
Anglo-Saxon countries far behind. After all, there seems to be a clear diﬀerence
with respect to the pursuit of equity between the diﬀerent worlds of welfare cap-
italism. Albeit this result is not surprising in the light of the huge redistributive
activities of the Nordic countries, it is indeed noteworthy that the huge govern-
mental encroachment in the market does not come along with a pronounced loss
in eﬃciency. So at ﬁrst glance, there is no sign of a considerable loss of general
welfare due to redistributive activities. In fact, the most equitable world, the
Nordic, one seems to outperform the other worlds in respect of GDP per head
in PPPs.
4 Modeling
The impression derived from our ﬁrst glance at the performance of the diﬀerent
welfare regimes on behalf of equity and eﬃciency tells us that there is indeed a
free lunch, i.e. there is no trade-oﬀ. Yet, this conclusion is premature. Economic
10world 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Continental 13.504 11.385 12.219 13.886 13.431
(7.614) (5.952) (6.049) (8.121) (7.614)
Nordic 10.552 12.604 12.114 11.017 12.336
(5.110) (7.359) (6.557) (5.872) (5.894)
Anglo-Saxon 17.294 18.810 22.756 21.026 21.788
(9.163) (10.088) (14.587) (12.251) (14.306)
Mediterranean 19.492 18.261 17.766 21.006 20.611
(12.148) (10.835) (10.075) (13.862) (13.814)
Table 4: Development of the poverty rate [60% povertyline resp. (in brackets)
50% povertyline].
eﬃciency and wealth are fostered by several factors. These might overcompen-
sate the harms of redistributional activities, leaving an overall surplus on the
balance sheet. In addition, a very liberal economic policy might well raise overall
eﬃciency but induce a more volatile and risky environment for the individual,
increasing on the one hand her demand for social protection and on the other
hand augmenting her willingness to contribute to public redistribution. The
protection against risk is indeed an important incitement for the expansion of
the welfare states in the last 50 years.15 Therefore an expansion of the welfare
state could foster eﬃciency as it could work as an insurance against risk, which
cannot be provided in the market place.
Indeed there is repeated evidence for this argument. Especially with regard
to the Scandinavean countries several authors make convincing points. Some
suggest that this apparent inconsistency with economic theory is due to the
fact that the Nordic countries can reap huge gains from international trade, as
they are very open economies and they have increased their openness substan-
tively.16 Another proposition is built on the development of economic liberty
in these countries, as there have been several reforms, e.g. regarding mone-
tary policy, labour markets and so on, that could have provided some eﬃciency
gains.17 As the argument goes, some of this rise was invested to maintain the
generous welfare state, with loss of eﬃciency, leaving still some welfare bulge
after deduction.
15 Bergh, A. (2006a), , p. 4-6; Rodrik, D. (1998), , p. 28-30.
16 Bergh, A. (2006a), , p- 11-13.
17 Bergh, A. (2006a), , p. 9-11.
11To test this hypothesis we must evaluate the inﬂuence of equity on eﬃciency,
controlling for other inﬂuences.18 For further analysis we concentrate now on
country data. Nevertheless we will control for an inﬂuence of the Nordic System
as a whole, as we suspect it to be possibly superior compared to the other
systems. For our empirical investigation we use GDP per capita in purchasing
power parities to measure the eﬃciency of a country. Social spending as share
of GDP should have a negative inﬂuence on eﬃciency if a tradeoﬀ exists. As
social spending not only captures redistributive activites but also insurance
against risk, we can use the Gini-Coeﬃcient as a correlate to control for this
eﬀect. We expect a moderate negative eﬀect when not controlling for income
redistribution. This is, because the redistributive and the insurance eﬀect can
not be told apart. After controlling for income distribution, the inﬂuence could
be even minor, as we then observe the partial eﬀect of social spending, that has
no egalitarian eﬀect on income distribution. The eﬀect of the Gini itself also
captures two eﬀects: change in income distribution due to redistribution and
market income. Thus, a very careful interpretation of the results is essential.
In addition, we use an interaction eﬀect for the social expenditure variable to
check our hypothesis that the Nordic countries - i.e. the Nordic Welfare System
- face a diﬀerent trade-oﬀ than the other countries. This interaction term should
capture the possibility that the Nordic countries face a free lunch or that they
can provide social security with less eﬃciency costs. This could give a hint that
the institutional design of the Nordic might be superior to the other welfare
systems.
On the other hand we use some correlates for Economic Freedom as this should
be a major driver of eﬃciency. International trade, employment and other as-
pects of Economic Freedom should have a positive impact on eﬃciency. Since
economic freedom cannot be measured directly, we use the EFI as a proxy vari-
able. As the Economic Freedom Index already accounts for Economic Openness
we have to keep in mind that this could lead to some multicollinearity prob-
lems. Additionally, one important factor for the development of GDP is edu-
cation resp. Human Capital. To capture this eﬀect, we use the overall public
18 For an elaborate summary of data sources see appendix A.
12spending on education as a percentage of GDP. This yields another possibility
to distinguish between diﬀerent kinds of public expenditure. In an increas-
ing risky environment, social spending and educational spending might well go
hand in hand, so it is important to control for each other. Furthermore, to check
for unknown drivers of growth, we use time dummies as correlates to capture
technological change and other eﬀects. Since we expect some inﬂuence of unob-
servable country characteristics, we further use a ﬁxed-eﬀects panel estimation
framework. Adding all correlates gives us the full model:
logGDPit = CONS + β1SOCIALGDPit + β2NORDSOCIALit + β3EFIit+




β8+t−1TIMEt + ui + it
This model should capture all neglected eﬀects on logGDP through time dum-
mies and ﬁxed-eﬀects. Nevertheless, it can be readily assumed that over drivers
of growth (especially capital and labour) stock will be at least uncorrelated to
social spending. So our main variable of interest should be unbiased.
5 Results
To verify the existence of a free lunch we proceed step by step: we start with
a simple OLS regression with cluster robust standard errors as a baseline spec-
iﬁcation. As we can see in table 5, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of
social spending and the interaction term on the logged GDP. When using a FE
panel estimation, thereby controlling for unobservable heterogeneity between
the diﬀerent countries, we still get no statistcally signiﬁcant results.
The picture changes after controlling for Economic Freedom, Output Gap and
Unemployment rate. As can be seen in the last three columns of table 5, we
now ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of social expenditure and the correlates Economic
Freedom and unemployment rate.19 An increase of social expenditure by one
13percentage point will on average go along with a loss of .4 to 1.3 percentage
points of GDP. This can be considered as quite a strong eﬀect. Nevertheless
the result is mixed for the Nordic countries. Although we ﬁnd no statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the interaction term, we can draw some careful conclusion.
In all conﬁgurations we ﬁnd a slightly positive impact of the interaction term,
implying that there are indeed some hints that the Nordic countries are better
in coping with the tradeoﬀ. As a matter of fact, after controlling for severable
variables which do hardly aﬀect the magnitude of the interaction term, i.e. in the
last two columns of table 5, we are conﬁrmed that the Nordic countries do face
a trade-oﬀ, but that it migth well be lower compared to the other countries.
These ﬁndings do not collide with economic theory, as it is conceivable that
the special institutional design of the Nordic countries derogates the trade-oﬀ
without totally eliminating it.
On the other hand, we also ﬁnd expected sings for the other correlates. Increas-
ing Economic Freedom by one point20 leads to an increase of GDP per head of
about 5%. The approximately same increase is reached by augmenting educa-
tional spending by one percentage point. Yet, a caveat has to be made with this
interpretation, as it might be possible that reverse causality holds: richer coun-
tries do spend more on education. Nevertheless, the interpretation of a rise of
the unemployment rate by one percentage point is easier to interpret: it lowers
GDP by roundabout 2%. Trade-to-GDP ratio and Output Gap on the other
hand have no statistical or economically signiﬁcant eﬀect. The former might be
due to the fact that the there is considerable multicollinearity between the EFI
and the ratio.21 The latter just gives some implication that the business cycle
has only minor importance.22
As a matter of fact, we should distinguish between the two tasks of the welfare
state, i.e. insurance against risk and redistribution. Since social spending as a
19 In the last column, we don’t ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the EFI. However, EFI and
ttgdp are jointly signiﬁcant with F(2,11) = 4.34;p < 0.05.
20 The Econmic Freedom Index is scaled between 0 and 10. An increase of one whole point
might therefore considered to be a lot. On the other hand several countries, e.g. the UK
and Sweden, indeed had a rise of the index by more than one point.
21 The correlation of the to factors is about .55 which can be considered as a medium large
eﬀect.
22 It is also possible that this might be due to the fact, that the unemployment rate and the






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15percentage of GDP deﬁnitely captures both issues, we use the gini-coeﬃcient
as a correlate to distingush between those diﬀerent eﬀects. As can be seen in
table 5 in the last column, the gini-coeﬃcient has a small negative eﬀect on
the GDP per head, i.e. an increasement of inequality lowers the GDP. The
inﬂuence of social expenditure essentially remains the same. Therfore social
spending has a negative eﬀect on GDP even when no redistribution takes place,
i.e. the gini-coeﬃcient is held constant. This is a little surprising but actually
it makes sense, as the insurance against risks might be provided more eﬃciently
by the market compared to the government. Furthermore it is still possible
that the government has advantages in providing some insurance, but that the
amount provided at the moment is too huge. This argumentation is backed
by the eﬀect of the interaction term: in the ﬁrst three columns of table 5 the
overall eﬀect of social spending for the Nordic countries is about zero. But
after controlling for educational spending, we ﬁnd an alltogether negative eﬀect.
I.e. if we keep education constant, the eﬀect of social spending is negative at
large. This could be due to the fact that educational spending increases with
social spending, being a major insurance against cumulative risks. Therefore,
an increasing demand for security is counteracted with more social security and
education. This result remains stable when adding trade openness and gini as
correlates (column 5, table 5). Additionally, the (statistically not signiﬁcant)
positive impact of more income equality on GDP makes perfect sense. As we
control for social expenditure, we see the partial eﬀect of more income equality
which is not due to redistribution as the case may be public expenditure, but
a result of a more equal market income. Higher income equality which is not
obtained by redistribution but by market forces kann well foster growth. Indeed,
this might be a hint for high social mobility and equality of opportunity in a
certain country. Nevertheless, as it is not a sigiﬁcant eﬀect, we must not worry
too much about this.
6 Discussion
In this paper we started oﬀ with the four European Welfare Systems. In Chapter
3 we studied descriptive statistics that should give some evidence for the superi-
16ority of the Nordic Model. Though we found that this conclusion is premature,
as after controlling for other factors the "free lunch" of the Nordic countries
vanishes (Chapter 5). The main ﬁnding of our paper is that we can conﬁdently
discard the thesis that a free lunch exists. We ﬁnd rather strong evidence for
a trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency. Yet, we ﬁnd some minor inﬂuence of
the Nordic system on the GDP costs of social expenditure. This implies that
the Nordic system might work more eﬃciently than the other social systems in
Europe and face a "smaller" trade-oﬀ. As this eﬀect is not statistical signiﬁcant
however, more research has to be done on this topic to ﬁgure out whether the
Nordic System is really superior or not.
So far, we have some policy implications:
• Economic Freedom: Economic Policy should promote Economic Free-
dom and liberalism as a major driver of prosperity. As we have seen in the
ﬁrst chapters, the Nordic countries are able to maintain a high standard
of equity although - or even - because of their Economic Freedom and
openness.
• Redistribution: The institutional design of a welfare system does in-
deed matter. Albeit we found a negative inﬂuence of social spending on
GDP, there are some hints that the instituional design of the Nordic sys-
tem is more eﬃcient. Therefore, it is truely conceivable that the trade-oﬀ
between equity and eﬃciency can be ameliorated.
• Unemployment: Employment is a major driver of eﬃciency. The more
people are employed, the higher the economic eﬃciency. It goes without
saying that this might also lead to higher equity.
• Education: Educational spending fosters economic growth. Albeit
causality is not totally clear, there are several clues that educatio might
be one of the best insurances against risk that can be provided by the
government.
Alltogether, we can conclude that the trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency
continues to exist. The optimal amount of redistribution is to be decided by the
17preferences of the citizens of each country and the electoral process. However, it
might be possible to adopt some aspects of the Nordic system that can milden
the eﬃciency costs. Finding these particular advantages and conﬁrming our
empirial results should be left to further research.
18A Data Resources
Fraser Institute: Economic Freedom Index (EFI),
http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html.
International Monetary Funde (IMF): Gross domestic product based on
purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP, Unemployment Rate, IMF World
Economic Outlook (WEO), October 2007),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/weodata/index.aspx.
Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS): All equity Indicators, LIS Key Figures,
http://www.lisproject.org/keyﬁgures.htm.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD):
Trade-to-GDP-Ratio, Social Expenditure as percentage of GDP, OECD. Stat
Extracts,
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx.
Worldbank: Public Education Expenditure as % of GDP, EdStats Data Query,
http://tinyurl.com/4fnh5k.
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